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I. KAHLER V. KANSAS:1 SETTING THE STAGE 
 
In January 2009, Karen Kahler filed for divorce from her husband, James. Over 
the next ten months, James became increasingly angry, assaulted Karen once 
(pleading guilty to the crime), and regularly stalked her. Finally, on November 28, 
2009, James, armed with a high-powered rifle, drove nearly an hour from his 
parent’s home where he was temporarily living to the home of Karen’s grandmother, 
where she was staying with their son and two daughters. There, James broke in and 
shot to death Karen, their daughters, and Karen’s grandmother. James allowed his 
son to flee.2 The grandmother’s Life Alert system recorded some of the shootings 
and recorded James saying, “Oh shit! I am going to kill her . . . G-d damn it!”3 
James Kahler was charged with capital murder. His examining psychiatrist 
determined that Kahler suffered from “severe major depression and obsessive-
compulsive/narcissistic personality deterioration.”4 The State’s mental health expert 
largely agreed with this diagnosis.5 The defense’s expert also asserted that at the 
time of the shootings, Kahler’s depression was so severe that he “did not make a 
genuine choice to kill his family members.” Instead, he “‘felt compelled 
and . . . basically for . . . at least that short period of time completely lost control’ of 
his faculties.”6 
Unfortunately for Kahler, who wished to assert an insanity defense, Kansas 
abolished the defense in 1995, adopting instead the so-called “mens rea approach” 
to mental illness. By statute, it is “a defense to a prosecution under any statute that 
the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental 
 
*    Distinguished University Professor Emeritus and Professor of Law Emeritus, The Ohio State 
University, Michael E. Moritz College of Law. My thanks to Stephen Garvey for exceptionally helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
1    140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020). 
2    Brief for Respondent at 3–5, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) [hereinafter 
Respondent’s Brief] (No. 18-6135). 
3    Brief for Petitioner at 10, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) [hereinafter Petitioner’s 
Brief] (No. 18-6135). 
4    Id. at *9 (quoting the trial transcript). 
5    Id. at *10–11. 
6    Id. at *11 (quoting the trial transcript). 
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state required as an element of the crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not 
otherwise a defense.”7 That provision, however, was of no value to Kahler, because 
whatever mental health issues he experienced when he went on his killing rampage, 
they did not disprove that he intended to kill his family. Indeed, the Life Alert 
recording helped proved his intent. Thus, all of the elements of capital murder were 
provable and proven. Without an insanity defense available, Kahler was easily 
convicted. 
Under Kansas law, Kahler is also entitled to introduce mental health evidence 
at the sentencing phase to mitigate his punishment based on proof that “[t]he 
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct or 
to conform the defendant’s conduct to the requirement of law was substantially 
impaired.”8 Kansas law also authorizes a judge to commit a convicted defendant to 
a mental health facility rather than prison if “the defendant is in need of psychiatric 
care,” “such treatment may materially aid in the defendant’s rehabilitation,” and if 
“the defendant and society are not likely to be endangered” by permitting the 
defendant to receive psychiatric care in lieu of imprisonment.9 Nonetheless, Kahler 
was sentenced to death. 
Kahler appealed his conviction to the Kansas Supreme Court, contending in 
part that Kansas’s abolition of the insanity defense violated the United States 
Constitution. The state court affirmed his conviction and death sentence.10 Kahler 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on March 18, 
2019. 
A year later, the Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, in an opinion authored by Justice 
Elena Kagan, held that Kansas’s statutory scheme did not violate the Due Process 
Clause.11 Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia 
Sotomayor, dissented. 
Was the Supreme Court’s ruling predictable? Yes, although the Court reached 
the predictable outcome in a particularly odd way. It does not say that abolition of 
the insanity defense is constitutional, but rather that, because Kansas permits a 
defendant to introduce mental illness evidence to negate the mens rea element of an 
offense and at sentencing to mitigate punishment, “Kansas’s scheme does not 
abolish the insanity defense.”12 
Was the ruling correct as a matter of constitutional law? Although it is a close 
issue, I am satisfied that Justice Breyer’s dissent offers the better constitutional 
analysis. 
 
7    KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3230 (2009).  
8    KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a)(6) (2011). 
9    KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3430 (2014). 
10   State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018). 
11   Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1025 (2020).  
12   Id. at 1031, n.6. 
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Constitutional issues aside, is abolition of the insanity defense wise public 
policy? No, and this is not a close issue. Indeed, even some justices in the majority 
opinion may doubt the wisdom of the Kansas approach.13 
Finally, is there a single, overall thesis to this essay? No, but the most important 
one is this: when you ask the wrong question, you get the wrong answer. Kahler v. 
Kansas proves this point. More on this as we proceed. 
 
II. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 
A. The Court’s Historic Hesitation to Intervene 
 
The Supreme Court’s ruling that Kansas’s statutory scheme did not violate the 
Due Process Clause did not surprise me. Indeed, my Criminal Law students from 
last year may remember that I predicted that the Court would vote 7-2 against 
Kahler. My error was in believing that Justice Breyer would vote with the majority 
rather than write the dissenting position. 
My prediction that Kansas would prevail required no real prescience. I expect 
that nearly all criminal law specialists expected this outcome. One of my students 
asked me after class whether I thought the outcome would have been different had 
this issue arisen earlier, for example, during the activist Warren Court’s so-called 
“criminal procedure revolution.” I told her, “No.” 
How did the Warren Court deal with substantive criminal law? If one thinks 
about it, nobody talks about the “Warren Court’s substantive criminal law 
revolution” because it never happened. Even though the Court stated in 1952 that 
the doctrine of “mens rea” is not a “provincial or transient notion,” and that “[i]t is 
as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the 
human will,”14 the Warren Court never held that strict liability crimes—punishment 
in the absence of culpability—are per se unconstitutional.15 The Warren Court 
blinked. 
And, as I have written elsewhere,16 when the Warren Court did put a 
constitutional toe in the water and intervene in the area of substantive criminal law, 
it typically backed away quickly. For example, in Lambert v. California,17 the Court 
 
13   Id. at n.7 (“The dissent . . . considers Kansas’s view benighted (as maybe some in the 
majority do too).” (emphasis added). 
14   Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
15   Professor Herbert Packer wryly observed that “[m]ens rea is an important requirement, but 
it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.” Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme 
Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 107. 
16   Joshua Dressler, Reflections on the Warren Court’s Criminal Justice Legacy, Fifty Years 
Later: What the Wings of a Butterfly and a Yiddish Proverb Teach Me, 51 U. PAC. L. Rev. 727, 737–
39 (2020). 
17   355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
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held that under very limited circumstances it violates the Due Process Clause to 
convict a person for violating a law (actually, here, a city ordinance) of which he 
was unaware, notwithstanding the common law doctrine that ignorance of the law is 
not an excuse. Justice Felix Frankfurter was correct, however, when he observed in 
his dissent that “the present decision will turn out to be an isolated deviation from 
the strong current of precedents—a derelict on the waters of the law.”18 
Similarly, there is the Warren Court’s toe-in-the-water approach to the Eighth 
Amendment. In Robinson v. California,19 the Warren Court declared 
unconstitutional a California statute that made it a criminal offense to “be addicted 
to the use of narcotics.” The Court said that “[e]ven one day in prison”20 constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment for being “guilty” of possessing the diseased status of 
being a drug addict. The logical extension of this ruling, as Justice White observed 
in his dissent, was that if it is unconstitutional to convict a person for being an addict, 
“it is difficult to understand why it would be any less offensive . . . to convict him 
for use” of narcotics.21 But, oops, just five years later, in Powell v. Texas,22 the 
Warren Court rejected the logic of Robinson and held that even if a person suffers 
from the disease of alcoholism, it does not violate the Constitution to make it an 
offense to “be found in a state of intoxication in a public place.” What is significant 
here is that, writing for the Court, Justice Marshall—Justice Marshall!—candidly 
observed that if Robinson was interpreted as most observers (including Justice 
White) understood it, “it is difficult to see any limiting principle that would serve to 
prevent this Court from becoming . . . the ultimate arbiter of the standards of 
criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout the 
country.”23 “Ultimate arbiter” of substantive criminal law doctrine was a role even 
the activist Warren Court was unwilling to play. 
So, if the Warren Court was extremely hesitant to “invade” the legislative 
province, it was inevitable that today’s more conservative Supreme Court would be 
disinclined to tell Kansas what excuse defenses it must recognize. Thus, the outcome 
in Kahler, if not its reasoning, was virtually preordained. 
 
B. A Bad Case to Make the Case for Insanity 
 
For those who wanted the Supreme Court to write an eloquent defense of the 
insanity defense despite the Court’s general reluctance to intervene in such cases, 
Kahler v. Kansas was a particularly unappealing one to bring to the Court. First, the 
 
18   Id. at 232. 
19   370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
20   Id. at 667. 
21   Id. at 688. 
22   392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
23   Id. at 533. 
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facts are awful. Four defenseless persons were killed, including two children. And 
the facts do not seem all that abnormal: an angry husband, an estranged wife; a bitter 
divorce process including child custody fights; then, violence. We unhappily hear 
about these situations all of the time. Insanity? Really? There was nothing bizarre 
about the facts. Moreover, Kahler had no history of psychiatric care before the 
shooting. It just sounds like another man with anger management problems. 
This was not like the tragic and bizarre case of Andrea Yates,24 who had a long 
history of mental illness and civil commitment before she drowned her four beloved 
little children in the bathtub in order to save them from the Devil. Longshot or not, 
if you are going to argue that the Constitution demands that a state permit a mentally 
disturbed person to plead insanity, advocates for the defense would surely have 
preferred Andrea Yates rather than James Kahler to assert the claim. 
There is more. The question presented to the Court in the Petitioner’s brief was 
“Do the Eighth25 and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity 
defense?” In the brief, however, counsel argued exclusively for one version of the 
insanity test, specifically, the M’Naghten test.26 Thus, the brief states, “[a] mentally 
ill person who commits a harmful act with no rational appreciation that it is [morally] 
wrong lacks the essential prerequisite for criminal punishment.”27 
This exclusive focus on M’Naghten is understandable because that was the test 
applied in Kansas before abolition and because M’Naghten was the dominant 
common law test. That means, however, that Kahler’s counsel was asking the 
Supreme Court not only to declare that the Constitution requires a State to recognize 
an insanity defense, but also to require Kansas to apply a specific definition of 
insanity, rather than to assert that there constitutionally must be an insanity defense, 
an old version or a new one, but it is up to the State of Kansas to decide which one 
it will be. 
Finally, to make this case particularly unappealing, at least on the basis of the 
evidence introduced, James Kahler likely was not insane under the M’Naghten test. 
The closest the defense expert came to making a case for insanity was when he 
reported that Kahler “felt compelled” to kill.28 That sounds like a volitional 
incapacity claim, not a cognitive one. And, since Kahler purposely spared his son—




24   Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App. 2005). 
25   The Court did not reach the Eighth Amendment issue because Kahler had failed to raise it in 
the Kansas courts. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1027, n.4 (2020). 
26   M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
27   Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 3, at *12. 
28   See Petitioner’s Brief supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
29   Respondent’s Brief, supra note 2, at *5. 
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III. THE OPINION (AND MY CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ALONG THE WAY) 
 
As I have noted, the issue in the case as initially set out in petitioner Kahler’s 
brief was whether the Due Process Clause30 permits a state to abolish the insanity 
defense. Justice Kagan, writing for the six-justice majority, stated the issue more 
narrowly: “The issue here is whether the Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause . . . compels the acquittal of any defendant who, because of mental illness, 
could not tell right from wrong when committing his crime.”31 Elsewhere, Kagan 
writes that “[w]e . . . decline to require that Kansas adopt an insanity test turning on 
a defendant’s ability to recognize that his crime was morally wrong.”32 In other 
words, the issue the Court majority claimed to be deciding was whether Kansas was 
compelled by the Due Process Clause to apply a specific definition of insanity. 
With the issue thus narrowed, Justice Kagan stated that “[w]ithin broad 
limits . . . ‘doctrine[s] of criminal responsibility’ must remain ‘the province of the 
States.’”33 They are “a project for state governance, not constitutional law.”34 
Anyone who seeks to use the Due Process Clause as a basis for compelling a 
legislature to adopt a particular rule of criminal liability “must surmount a high 
bar.”35 
The high bar that a petitioner must surmount to prove that a state has violated 
the Due Process Clause is to show that its approach “‘offends some principle of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’”36 And, in applying that test, the “primary guide” is “‘historical 
practice’ . . . . And in assessing that practice, we look primarily to eminent common-
law authorities (Blackstone, Coke, Hale, and the like), as well as to early English 
and American judicial decisions.”37 As Kagan put it, the ultimate “question is 
whether a rule of criminal responsibility is so old and venerable—so entrenched in 
the central values of our legal system—as to prevent a State from ever choosing 
 
30   See Kahler supra note 25. 
31   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1024–25. 
32   Id. at 1037. 
33   Id. at 1028 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534, 536 (1968) (plurality 
opinion)). 
34   Id. at 1037. 
35   Id. at 1027. 
36   Id. (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)). 
37   Id. (quoting, in part, Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (plurality opinion)). 
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another.”38 Or, “said just a bit differently,” the issue here is whether the Due Process 
Clause “‘imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity.’”39 
This way of expressing the issue was critical. Rather than asking whether the 
Constitution permits a state to impose criminal punishment on mentally ill persons 
who are not responsible for their actions—the proper question—the court asked, and 
then answered, the wrong question of whether a particular rule of criminal 
responsibility—specifically, whether a person must be excused if, due to mental 
illness, he is unable to recognize that his conduct was morally wrong—is “so old 
and venerable” that a State is not permitted to choose a different responsibility rule. 
Although Kahler originally expressed the issue in general terms of whether Kansas 
was compelled to recognize an insanity defense, the Court (concededly with the help 
of Kahler’s brief40) treated the issue more narrowly. Lesson: you ask the wrong 
question, you get the wrong answer. 
Having said this—and one should not lose sight of this—the majority concedes 
that “Kahler is right that for hundreds of years jurists and judges have recognized 
insanity (however defined) as relieving responsibility for a crime.”41 This is a critical 
admission. In other words, an insanity excuse is “old and venerable” and 
“entrenched” in the central values of our legal system. It has been the case for 
centuries that those who are not responsible for their actions due to mental illness 
are exempt from punishment. By narrowing the question, however, to whether a 
specific definition of insanity is entrenched, Justice Kagan was able to shift the focus 
and use much of the majority opinion to demonstrate that early common law 
commentators and courts proposed various versions of the insanity defense, some 
focusing on whether the mentally ill actor thought his particular act was moral, 
others considering whether the mentally actor thought the particular act was illegal, 
and still others looking at whether the actor “had the ability to do much thinking at 
all.”42 
Significantly, Justice Kagan made this additional (and I will argue, erroneous) 
point in the opinion: “Early commentators on the common law proposed various 
formulations of the insanity defense, with some favoring a morality inquiry and 
others a mens rea approach.”43 She points to early opinions in which “moral 
incapacity was a byproduct of the kind of cognitive breakdown that precluded 
finding mens rea, rather than a self-sufficient test of insanity.”44 In other words, 
 
38   Id. at 1028. 
39   Id. at 1029 (quoting Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 753 (2006)). 
40   See Petitioner’s Brief supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
41   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1030. 
42   Id. at 1033. 
43   Id. at 1032. 
44   Id. at 1034. 
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Kagan was saying that Kansas’s statutory system, which permits a defendant to 
introduce mental health evidence to disprove the mens rea element of a crime (here, 
Kahler’s intent to kill), is consistent with one common law version of the insanity 
defense. 
This historical analysis is wrong or, at least, overstated. The Court is attaching 
a modern understanding of “mens rea” to the term rather than the one used centuries 
ago by the scholars it quotes. In early years, the term “mens rea” simply meant that 
an actor committed the offense with a “morally blameworthy state of mind.” Mens 
rea, in this sense, meant that the defendant was morally culpable in committing the 
crime. Thus, to use a different excuse to make the same point, a person coerced to 
commit a crime because of a threat of imminent death is often said to lack “mens 
rea” in the sense that she was not blameworthy even though she intentionally 
committed the harmful act.45 In modern times, particularly since the advent of the 
Model Penal Code, however, the term “mens rea” more often means “the particular 
mental state element in the definition of the offense.”46 
Thus, when common law commentators spoke of an insane person lacking 
“mens rea” or “lacking intent,” they were making the point that the insane person 
lacked moral culpability for the act; they did not typically mean what the Kansas 
statute has in mind when it allows the mentally ill person to demonstrate that he 
lacked the specific element of “intent” in the definition of the crime. Justice Breyer, 
in his dissent, makes this very point: 
 
The Court points out . . . that many of the common-law sources state that 
the insane lack mens rea or felonious intent. But what did they mean by 
that? At common law, the term mens rea ordinarily incorporated the notion 
of “general moral blameworthiness” required for criminal 
punishment . . . . The modern meaning of mens rea is narrower and more 
technical. It refers to the “state of mind . . . that, together with its 
accompanying conduct, the criminal law defines as an offense.”47 
 
Therefore, once one understands “mens rea” in “culpability” terms, and thus 
once one sees that it has long been understood that an insane person, however the 
word “insane” is defined, is lacking in moral culpability, it follows that the insanity 
 
45   This use of the term “mens rea” persists in modern times. See, e.g., United States v. 
Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1978) (when a person acts under duress, this “negates the 
existence of the requisite Mens rea for the crime in question”). 
46   For a fuller explanation of the dual meanings of “mens rea”—the culpability and the 
elemental meanings—see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.02 (8th ed. 
2018) [hereinafter DRESSLER]. 
47   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1042 (quoting Frances Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
974, 988 (1932)). 
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excuse (although perhaps no particular version of the defense) is deeply entrenched. 
And, as noted,48 the majority opinion concedes this! 
So, how can the majority concede this and yet still find that Kansas, which has 
abolished the insanity defense, is acting constitutionally? The answer lies in this 
explanation by Justice Kagan: 
 
First, Kansas has an insanity defense negating criminal liability—even 
though not the type Kahler demands. As noted earlier, Kansas law 
provides that it is “a defense to a prosecution” that “the defendant, as a 
result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state 
required” for a crime . . . . 
Second, and significantly, Kansas permits a defendant to offer whatever 
mental health evidence he deems relevant at sentencing . . . . In other 
words, any manifestation of mental illness that Kansas’s guilt-phase 
insanity defense disregards—including the moral incapacity Kahler 
highlights—can come in later to mitigate culpability and lessen 
punishment. And that same kind of evidence can persuade a judge to 
replace any prison term with commitment to a mental health facility. 
So . . . a defendant arguing moral incapacity may well receive the same 
treatment in Kansas as in State that would acquit—and, almost certainly, 
commit—him for that reason . . . . [These aspects of Kansas law] defeat[] 
Kahler’s charge that the State has “abolish[ed] the insanity defense 
entirely.”49 
 
Wow. As Professor Orin Kerr has remarked, it is rather odd to say that because 
a defendant is permitted to introduce mental health evidence in order to negate an 
element of a crime that this constitutes an insanity defense. His example: 
 
Imagine a defendant is charged with failure to obey a police officer’s 
order. His defense is that he is deaf and did not hear the order. Under 
[ordinary] rules of criminal law, the defense is permitted to put on 
evidence that he is deaf and didn’t hear the order. But we wouldn’t say 
that the law enacts a “deafness defense.” Instead, we would see that as just 
the ordinary rules of liability. The government has to prove the elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that’s true whether the 
evidence for or against those elements existing happens to involve mental 
health evidence (in Kahler) or evidence of deafness (in this example).50 
 
48   See Kahler supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
49   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1030–31 (emphasis added). 
50   Orin S. Kerr, Due Process and the Criminal Law: A Few Thoughts on Kahler v. Kansas, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 24, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/03/24/due-process-and-the-criminal-
law-a-few-thoughts-on-kahler-v-kansas/. 
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Indeed, to suggest that a defendant who introduces evidence in order to raise a 
reasonable doubt regarding one of the prima facie elements of the crime is thereby 
raising a “defense” is to blur the distinction between asserting an affirmative defense 
and merely casting doubt on the government’s case-in-chief. Surely every Justice 
who signed on to the majority opinion understands this distinction. Did they think 
they were fooling anyone? 
Even more startling is the suggestion that post-conviction evidence, which 
might result in mitigation of punishment or commitment to a mental facility, is a 
form of “insanity defense.” Justice Breyer has it right when he writes in dissent: 
 
Consider the basic reason that underlies and explains this long legal 
tradition [of an insanity defense] . . . . The tradition reflects the fact that a 
community’s moral code informs its criminal law. As Henry Hart stated 
it, the very definition of crime is conduct that merits “a formal and solemn 
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.”51 
 
Indeed, allowing a defendant to introduce mental illness evidence at the 
sentencing phase—after the guilty verdict—is too late. As has been said, “[t]he 
essence of punishment for moral delinquency lies in the criminal conviction itself.”52 
When a person is convicted of a crime, at that instant, she is punished because the 
community (through the jury) has condemned her as a moral wrongdoer. Without an 
insanity defense—a true insanity defense—a person who is not morally responsible 
for her actions may be convicted of a crime and thus wrongly—immorally—
stigmatized as a moral delinquent worthy of condemnation by the community and 
subjected to the collateral consequences of possessing a criminal record. 
 
IV. FURTHER REFLECTIONS AND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FUTURE 
 
A. Why I Believe Kagan Was Mostly Wrong 
 
I said at the start of this essay that I thought the constitutional issue in Kahler 
was a close one but that ultimately Justice Breyer’s dissent is more persuasive. My 
reasons for siding with the dissent were largely laid out in Part III, but I want to go 
a bit deeper here. 
The majority conceded that for centuries “jurists and judges” have recognized 
insanity, “however defined,” as “relieving responsibility for a crime.” This is the 
critical point. This is the question the Court should have asked and answered. It does 
 
51   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1047 (quoting Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 405 (1958)). 
52   George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33 
B.U. L. REV. 176, 193 (1953) (emphasis added). 
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violate due process to deny a defendant, such as James Kahler, an opportunity to 
prove that, as a result of mental illness, he should be relieved of responsibility for 
his actions. The key word here is “responsibility.” 
Where the majority goes wrong is by equating a statute that allows Kahler to 
show that, as a result of a mental disorder, he did not intend to kill his victims, with 
a claim of non-responsibility for his actions due to insanity. The former is not an 
excuse-by-insanity but a failure-of-proof defense, conceptually similar to, for 
example, a claim of mistake of fact by a perfectly sane hunter who shoots a human 
being believing it is a deer. That hunter is not claiming he is not responsible for his 
actions; he is asserting that his mistake negates a charge of intent-to-kill a human 
being (and on the right facts might even negate a charge of recklessness or 
negligence). 
The point of the insanity defense, as with the common law infancy excuse, is 
that some people, because of a condition for which they are not responsible—mental 
illness or age—are not deemed moral agents53 and, therefore, are not morally and 
legally responsible for their actions. In that absolutely critical sense, Justice Kagan 
is wrong, therefore, when she concludes that “Kansas’s scheme does not abolish the 
insanity defense.”54 Because Kansas does not provide an affirmative defense of 
insanity, it has abolished the insanity defense. The Court’s version of an “insanity 
defense” is a faux insanity defense. It follows from this that it is even odder for the 
majority to suggest that an insanity defense exists in Kansas because it permits 
Kahler after conviction—after being deemed responsible for his actions—to try to 
mitigate his punishment. 
So, what should the Court have said? The dissenters got it right. As Breyer 
wrote, Kansas “eliminated the core of a defense that has existed for centuries: that 
the defendant, due to mental illness, lacked the mental capacity necessary for his 
conduct to be considered morally blameworthy.”55 As he further explained, 
“[m]atters of degree, specific content, and aptness of application all may be, and 
have always been, the subject of legal dispute. But the general purpose—to ensure 
a rough congruence between the criminal law and widely accepted moral 
sentiments—persists.”56 
Amen to that. Judge Irving Kaufman made the same point years ago when he 
wrote that “[t]he fact that the law has, for centuries, regarded [insane] wrong-doers 
 
53   There is debate as to whether the M’Naghten test is better understood to require proof that, 
as a result of mental disease or defect, the actor lacked the cognitive capacity to know right from wrong  
or whether it is enough to show that, at the time of the crime, as a result of mental illness, he simply 
did not know that his actions were wrong, i.e., that lack of capacity is required. For an excellent 
discussion of this and other aspects of the insanity defense, see Stephen P. Garvey, Insanity, THE 
PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 385–419 (Larry Alexander & 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2019). 
54   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1031, footnote 6. 
55   Id. at 1038. 
56   Id. at 1047 (emphasis added). 
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as improper subjects for punishment is a testament to the extent to which that moral 
sense has developed.”57 And, as Judge Thurman Arnold wrote, “[t]o punish a man 
who lacks the power to reason is as undignified and unworthy as punishing an 
inanimate object or an animal. A man who cannot reason cannot be the subject to 
blame. Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose 
blame.”58 
Return to Andrea Yates. She knew that she was killing her children. She had 
the intent to kill them. But, it would be “undignified and unworthy” to hold her 
responsible for her actions in view of her deeply mentally disorganized state of mind. 
And, indeed, despite the awfulness of her actions, a jury did rule that she was not 
responsible for her actions because an insanity defense—the real kind, not the faux 
version—was available to her. If she had committed these acts in Kansas, however, 
she would have been guilty of four counts of intentional murder. I submit that our 
collective consciences should reject such an outcome as long as, per Justice Breyer, 
a “rough congruence between the criminal law and widely accepted moral 
sentiments [are to persist].”59 
The majority opinion in Kahler expresses a very different sentiment: that 
persons such as Yates are morally responsible for their actions but may avoid the 
harshest punishments if they can convince the decisionmaker to be merciful or 
compassionate after conviction. But, the issue here is not one of mercy or 
compassion, but of justice, as Professor Sanford Kadish has written, “[t]o blame a 
person is to express a moral criticism, and if the person[] . . . does not deserve 
criticism, blaming him is a kind of falsehood and is . . . unjust to him.”60 A true 
insanity defense distinguishes between those who are moral agents and those who 
are not. 
It follows from all of this where I stand on the policy matter: it should not only 
be unconstitutional, but wrong as a matter of humane policy to abolish the true 
insanity defense. All of that said, I do agree with Justice Kagan in one important 
regard. She wrote: 
 
Defining the precise relationship between criminal culpability and mental 
illness involves examining the workings of the brain, the purposes of the 
criminal law, the ideas of free will and responsibility. It is a project 
demanding hard choices among values, in a context replete with 
uncertainty, even at a single moment in time. And it is a project, if any is, 
 
57   United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966). 
58   Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666–67 (D.C. Cir. 1945). 
59   Kahler at 1047. 
60   Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 264 (1987). 
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that should be open to revision over time, as new medical knowledge 
emerges and as legal and moral norms evolve.61 
 
I tell my Criminal Law students on the first day of class that the course they 
will be taking asks, as I put it, “the Big Questions—questions about human nature, 
personal and social responsibility, and ‘right and wrong’—which philosophers, 
theologians, scientists, and poets, as well as lawyers, have grappled with for 
centuries.”62 And, if this is true, it does follow that, in a democracy, it is generally 
more appropriate to let legislators, supposedly the representatives of the 
community’s values, to craft the contours of an excuse defense than to have a small 
number of often unelected judges define the excuse. 
The dissenters in Kahler don’t disagree with this. As they point out, when one 
looks at all of the definitions of insanity that have been a part of Anglo-American 
common law for the past three centuries and at post-common law statutes, 
M’Naghten in its various forms merely sets out one standard. There are other tests, 
including the American Law Institute definition of insanity, the “irresistible 
impulse” test, and the “product” test.63 Whether the legal definition of insanity test 
should be as narrow as M’Naghten, as broad as the “product” test, or something not 
yet even adopted,64 is a matter for states to determine once it is understood that the 
Constitution demands that there be some true insanity excuse defense. 
 
B. Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
1. The Lingering Eighth Amendment Issue 
 
Although the parties spent significant time in their briefs debating whether 
abolition of the insanity defense violates the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment, the Supreme Court did not resolve this issue. 
I won’t deal in detail with this question, but it is worth a brief comment. The 
State of Kansas argued that the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
is limited to forbidding modes of punishment considered cruel at the time that the 
 
61   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037. 
62   Joshua Dressler & Stephen P. Garvey, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS viii (8th 
ed. 2019). As that quote is from the Preface, I make my “Big Questions” speech directly in class 
(what students ever read a Preface?) and add “just regular people” to the list of those who consider 
these issues, and expand the time we have been considering these questions to “the beginning of 
time!” It makes for a great speech, if I do say so myself. 
63   For a nice summary of these tests and criticisms leveled against each, see State v. Johnson, 
121 R.I. 254, 399 A.2d 469 (1979). 
64   My preferred test is the so-called “justice test” suggested by Judge David Bazelon in United 
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“a defendant is not responsible if at the time 
of his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or behavior controls were impaired to such 
an extent that he cannot justly be held responsible for his act”) (emphasis omitted). 
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Amendment was adopted, as well as punishment excessive in light of “evolving 
standards of decency.”65 Surely, however, punishment—even one day in jail—is 
excessive if it is imposed on a person who is morally blameless for his actions 
because of mental illness. And, as noted before, the very fact that a person is 
convicted of a crime constitutes punishment in that it falsely stigmatizes the person 
if he is morally innocent. Professor John Stinneford, in an amicus brief in support of 
neither party, which focused exclusively on the Eighth Amendment question, 
concluded that: 
 
Abolishing the defense is a dramatic departure that significantly extends 
the reach of criminal liability—including to those who lack moral 
culpability, as traditionally conceived. It is likely that the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, if read in light of its history and original 
meaning, would proscribe Kansas’s outright abolition of the insanity 
defense.66 
 
Although I hold out little hope that the Supreme Court will agree with Professor 
Stinneford, at least for now it remains unresolved. 
 
2. Can a State Go Further Than Kansas in Limiting Mental Health Testimony? 
 
Supposedly Kansas has an insanity defense because a defendant may introduce 
mental illness evidence in order to negate the mens rea element of an offense and as 
a post-conviction basis for punishment mitigation and possible removal to a mental 
institution. 
Okay, so what would it take for the Court to reach the conclusion that an 
“insanity defense,” even as unwisely defined as the Court did in Kahler, has truly 
been abolished and, therefore, violates the Due Process Clause? The Court majority 
offered no answer to this question. Indeed, it stated that, although Kansas did not 
abolish the insanity defense, “[w]e say nothing, one way or the other, about whether 
any other scheme might do so.”67 So, let’s look further. 
Consider the facts in Clark v. Arizona.68 Eric Clark, a deeply mentally disturbed 
person, sought to introduce expert mental health evidence to show that when he 
killed a police officer he believed he was killing an alien from outer space and, 
therefore, lacked the intent to kill a police officer, the mens rea element of the 
offense charged. Arizona, unlike Kansas, did not allow him to introduce such mens 
 
65   Respondent’s Brief, supra note 2, at 47 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 
(2012)). 
66   Brief for Professor John F. Stinneford as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 
*28–29, Kahler v. Kansas, 410 P.3d 105 (2018) (No. 18-6135) (filed June 7, 2019). 
67   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1031, n.6. 
68   548 U.S. 735 (2006). 
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rea testimony. Instead, again unlike Kansas, Arizona permitted Clark to introduce 
this testimony to prove he was legally insane under that state’s version of the 
M’Naghten test.69 The Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s system against 
constitutional attack.70 In other words, the Arizona scheme, essentially the converse 
of Kansas’s, is similarly constitutional. So: mens rea psychiatric defense + post-
conviction psychiatric mitigation + no insanity defense = constitutional (Kahler); 
and no mens rea psychiatric defense + an insanity defense = constitutional (Clark). 
It seems reasonable to believe that if a state does not permit mental health 
evidence for any purpose—to negate mens rea, serve as an affirmative defense, or 
as a sentencing mitigator—this would go too far. What if, however, a state (say, 
Arizona) abolishes both psychiatric mens rea testimony (as Arizona did) and the 
traditional insanity defense (as Kansas did), but allows (as in Kansas), the now 
convicted defendant (Eric Clark) the opportunity to introduce evidence of his long-
term mental illness as a potential basis for reduction in his punishment? Obviously, 
in light of my previous comments, I would consider this approach unconstitutional 
and awful policy, but would the Supreme Court? In other words, how important to 
the Court’s ruling was Kansas’s sentencing-phase provisions?  
Although Justice Kagan listed this aspect of Kansas law as her second reason 
for the Court’s there-is-an-insanity-defense finding, she described it as “second, and 
significantly.”71 She also made a point of the fact that under Kansas law, beyond 
punishment reduction, a judge has authority to “replace any prison term with 
commitment to a mental health facility,”72 and thus place the convicted party where 
a person found not guilty by reason of insanity would find himself, namely, in a 
mental health institution. 
Perhaps this latter aspect of Kansas law might be deemed constitutionally 
satisfactory to the personnel on this Court. If we are going to hypothetically suggest 
that an “insanity defense” may be based exclusively on the introduction of post-
conviction psychiatric testimony, it is easier to pretend that a “defense” exists if the 
statutory scheme allows a convicted murderer to introduce psychiatric evidence in 
order to be committed to a mental health facility than one that only permits, for 
example, a murderer, to have his sentence mitigated from life imprisonment to a 
sentence of years. 
Constitutional issues aside, it is interesting to speculate whether the Arizona or 
Kansas system is better or, as I would put it, less bad. Consider Eric Clark, who was 
convicted in Arizona. He would have preferred the Kansas approach. If a jury 
believed his testimony that he did not know he was killing a police officer—indeed, 
 
69   ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (2009) (“A person may be found guilty except 
insane if at the time of the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted with a mental 
disease or defect of such severity that the person did not know the criminal act was wrong.”). 
70   Clark, 548 U.S. at 770–71. 
71   Kahler at 1031 (emphasis added). 
72   Id.  
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if his testimony created a reasonable doubt as to this fact—the jury would have been 
required to acquit him. He didn’t even need a true insanity defense. But, what about 
Andrea Yates? She would have preferred Arizona. She intended to kill her four 
children, so what she needed was an opportunity to claim insanity, which would 
have been denied to her in Kansas. 
A policy question, however, should not be resolved by deciding which 
defendant is happier, but rather on the basis of which outcome is better from a moral 
and public safety perspective. From the public safety perspective, the Kansas system 
would potentially allow a dangerous and mentally ill person, but one who did not 
form the requisite intent (e.g., Clark) to be acquitted and released back to the 
streets.73 This would also be a bad long-term outcome for someone like Clark, who 
needed psychiatric help, even if it had to be imposed involuntarily. From a moral 
perspective, therefore, I would submit Arizona’s system is less bad because, by 
retaining an insanity defense, a person such as Eric Clark or Andrea Yates can 
potentially avoid a finding of moral responsibility and obtain needed mental health 
care. 
 
3. What Does Kahler Tell Us About Other Excuses? 
 
In light of Kahler, may a state now abolish other excuse defenses without 
violating the Due Process Clause? Justice Breyer expressed “doubt . . . that a State 
may do away with the defenses of duress or self-defense on that ground that, in its 
idiosyncratic judgment, they are not required.”74 
I don’t think we need to worry that any state would abolish the justification 
defense of self-defense, but what about excuse defenses, such as duress? A person 
who commits arson, for example, because she or a loved one is threatened with 
imminent death if she does not commit the crime, possesses the mens rea of that 
offense, so she would be convicted of arson if she were denied the duress defense. 
That should not be permitted. The underlying rationale of the defense is that a 
 
person acting under duress is excused, although [s]he possessed the 
capacity to make the right choice, if [s]he lacked a fair opportunity to act 
lawfully or, slightly more accurately, if [s]he lacked a fair opportunity to 
avoid acting unlawfully . . . .  
At its core, the defense of duress requires us to determine what conduct 
we, a society of individual members of the human race, may legitimately 
expect of our fellow threatened humans.75 
 
 
73   He might be civilly committed at some later time. 
74   Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1047. 
75   Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching 
for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1365–66 (1989). 
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In other words, “there but for the grace of God go I.” How can it be morally 
right to blame and punish someone who twelve jurors would conclude is no different 
than they are: a normal person, but not a hero? 
So, does this mean that abolition of the duress defense, although morally 
obtuse, is unconstitutional? Perhaps not. The common law did not recognize the 
duress excuse in murder prosecutions, and most states still do not recognize it in 
such circumstances,76 so it lacks the historical pedigree of the insanity defense. 
Perhaps this excuse could be abolished for all crimes, particularly if a state permits 
the defendant to argue for mitigation during sentencing. However, as the duress 
defense, by its nature, is pled by “normal” people—people like us, rather than “those 
crazy people”—it is unlikely a legislature would find it as politically expedient to 




The Kahler opinion could have been worse. That is the best that I can say for 
it. We now must wait to see whether legislatures that retain a true insanity defense 
will use this case as an opportunity to repeal it, and whether they will push the 
envelope further to see how far they may constitutionally go to bar mental health 
testimony. For those of us who believe that a full-throated insanity defense is wise 
policy, however, we cannot rely on the United States Supreme Court to protect the 
penal interests of the mentally ill. 
 
76   DRESSLER, supra note 46 at § 23.04[A]. 
